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ABSTRACT We study the relationship between diversification and firm performance in the 
context of the decline in levels of diversification over time. We argue that the pressure to 
reduce diversification may have more strongly affected those firms whose diversification 
strategies were most detrimental to firm performance. We employ meta-analytical regression 
(MARA) in order to test our hypotheses, using a total of 267 primary studies containing 387 
effect sizes based on 150,000 firm-level observations from over 60 years of research on the 
diversification–firm performance relationship. The findings suggest that levels of unrelated 
diversification have decreased, whereas levels of related diversification have increased since the 
mid-1990s, following an initial decrease in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, we find that the 
relationship between unrelated diversification and firm performance has improved signifi-
cantly over time, whereas the relationship between related diversification and performance has 
remained relatively stable.
Keywords: diversification, corporate refocusing, firm performance, meta-analysis
A widely shared view in the strategic management literature that has permeated leading 
textbooks on corporate strategy (Hitt et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2008) holds that the re-
lationship between corporate diversification and firm performance is inverted U-shaped 
(Pierce and Aguinis, 2013; Rumelt, 1974). According to this view, small diversification 
steps, in particular into lines of business that are related to a firm’s existing one(s), tend 
to have benefits (e.g., from sharing factors across different business lines) that outweigh 
their disadvantages. However, as firms diversify into further and less related lines of 
business, the marginal benefits of doing so decline and the marginal costs increase, 
such that above its optimal level the effects of diversification on performance begin to 
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turn negative (Markides, 1995).1 A large number of empirical studies, including several 
meta-analyses, have attested to this view (e.g., Palich et al., 2000).
Little is known, however, about the effects of  the ‘refocusing’ that is reported to 
have taken place in recent decades (Bergh et al., 2008) on the nature of  the diversi-
fication–firm performance relationship. According to agency-theoretic (e.g., Kogut et 
al., 1992; Montgomery, 1994) and institutional (e.g., Lee et al., 2008; Wan, 2005; Wan 
and Hoskisson, 2003) perspectives, increasing shareholder power, a more active market 
for corporate control, and a liberalized market environment have curbed the ability of 
managers to pursue potentially value-destroying conglomeration strategies. These de-
velopments have led to the ‘de-institutionalization’ of  the conglomerate form in the late 
1980s and early 1990s in the US (Davis et al., 1994; Fligstein and Markowitz, 1993; 
Lichtenberg, 1992). In some other Western countries, a trend towards de-diversification 
also appears to have taken place (Whittington and Mayer, 2000), albeit at a slower pace. 
With respect to emerging economies, the picture is less clear. Lee et al. (2008) and Peng 
et al. (2005) argued that with increasing institutional development, the relative benefits of 
diversification have decreased, and its relative costs increased. Some studies have found 
that, as a result, aggregate levels of  diversification among emerging market firms have 
decreased (Hoskisson et al., 2005). At the same time, diversification continues to be an 
important strategy for many companies in markets such as India (Ramachandran et al., 
2013) and others.
Much of  the empirical evidence on diversification is based on data gathered during 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, there is little evidence on whether the trend away from 
diversification that appears to have taken place during that time has continued since 
then. The number of  studies that have investigated long-term trends in diversification 
(over several decades) is relatively small. There is thus value in aggregating what is known 
from primary, cross-sectional ‘snapshots’ of  levels of  diversification, and mapping them 
over time. Furthermore, many of  the extant studies on changes in diversification do not 
distinguish between related and unrelated diversification.
Against this background, our paper makes two contributions to the literature on cor-
porate diversification. First, we analyse the development of  diversification over time, 
distinguishing between related and unrelated forms of  diversification. Our study is more 
nuanced than extant research, by showing that the trends in related and unrelated di-
versification have been different. We apply meta-analysis in order to aggregate studies 
on diversification, and model these data as a function of  time. Our study covers over 
60 years of  research, a longer time period than any other quantitative study on levels of 
diversification.
Second, we investigate shifts in the diversification–performance relationship in the 
context of  the changes in levels of  diversification over time. This research interest is 
not merely an exploratory one, but has important theoretical implications. Specifically, 
authors including Mackey et al. (2017) have argued that the capacity to manage diversi-
fication is heterogeneously distributed across firms. They thus conceive the performance 
effects of  diversification not as an absolute value, as does the discussion about the di-
versification discount or premium in the finance literature (Campa and Kedia, 2002; 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Rajan et al., 2000), but rather as a variable that 
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differs between firms. Building on this view, we propose that environmental pressures 
to de-diversify have been greatest for those firms whose diversification strategies were 
particularly detrimental to value creation and performance. Our argument implies that, 
while overall levels of  diversification have declined over time, the average performance 
effect of  diversification (among the fewer firms that continued to diversify) may have 
become more positive (or at least less negative). By taking predominantly cross-sectional 
perspectives on ‘slices’ of  the diversification–performance relationship, extant research 
has paid little attention to the shift in the nature of  this relationship (Benito-Osorio et al., 
2012; Lee et al., 2008). Our work redresses this limitation, thus challenging the view that 
the diversification–performance relationship is inherently inverted U-shaped.2 We apply 
meta-analytical regression analysis (MARA) to a total of  267 primary studies containing 
387 effect sizes and over 150,000 firm-level observations from over 60 years of  research 
on the diversification–firm performance relationship.
DIVERSIFICATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH FIRM 
PERFORMANCE
Conceptual Foundations
Diversification is defined as a strategy that a firm pursues when operating in differ-
ent product or service markets simultaneously (Ansoff, 1957). Corporate diversification 
emerged on a broad scale in the 1960s as a popular strategy especially among U.S. firms 
(Markides, 1995). Following the work of some early observers of the diversification phe-
nomenon (Gort, 1962), researchers began to study diversification more systematically 
in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Channon, 1971; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976; Geroski and 
Jacquemin, 1984; Rumelt, 1974). The industrial organization literature assessed diver-
sification primarily in terms of its effects on competition (Li and Greenwood, 2004). 
Finance and strategic management researchers have been interested primarily in the 
consequences of diversification for firm-level performance outcomes, specifically capital 
market and accounting performance.
Strategic management scholars have argued for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between levels of  diversification and firm performance (Rumelt, 1974). The benefits of 
diversification include risk reduction; the cross-utilization and exploitation of  resources, 
such as managerial skills, talent and time; operational capabilities; physical and informa-
tional resources; and reputation (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). The common use of 
resources leads to economies of  scale (by using particular production factors more fully) 
and scope (through the sharing of  factors across business lines) (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 
2004; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). According to Markides 
(1995), the marginal benefits of  diversification decrease with increasing levels of  diversi-
fication. Firms are likely to exploit their resources (such as product- or customer-specific 
knowledge) in the first-best opportunity, such that returns from diversification into fur-
ther (and more remote) lines of  business are likely to decline.
At the same time, scholars have argued that the marginal costs of  diversification are an 
increasing function of  the level of  diversification, because its disadvantages (e.g., greater 
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coordination and integration costs) tend to grow disproportionately with increased diver-
sification (Grant et al., 1988; Hashai, 2015; Markides, 1992; Markides and Williamson, 
1994). Diversification creates costly complexity (Zhou, 2011), and internal information 
asymmetries increase with the degree of  diversification, because bounded rationality 
constrains management’s ability to process heterogeneous information from different 
lines of  business (Markides, 1995; Williamson, 1967). As a result of  decreasing marginal 
benefits and increasing marginal costs, diversification is widely seen to have an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with firm performance (Amit and Livnat, 1988; Lubatkin and 
Rogers, 1989; Markides, 1995; Pierce and Aguinis, 2013; Rumelt, 1974). Existing me-
ta-analyses in this area (Bausch and Pils, 2009; Palich et al., 2000) provide evidence that 
is consistent with this inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification on the one 
hand, and accounting and market performance on the other.
The level of  diversification is often equated with the degree of  relatedness, such that firms 
with a smaller (larger) number of  businesses are likely to be more related (unrelated) diver-
sifiers than those with a larger (smaller) number of  businesses. In this study, we adopt this 
practice, following the approach taken in prior meta-analyses in this field (e.g., Palich et al., 
2000). Relatedness can be defined in multiple ways (e.g., resource-based, capabilities-based, 
market-based), but is widely measured as relatedness between product or service markets 
(Markides and Williamson, 1994; Nocker et al., 2016). In contrast to unrelated businesses, 
related ones tend to share common firm-specific assets (Li and Greenwood, 2004; 
Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008) and to give rise to resource 
complementarities (Ennen and Richter, 2010). As Klein and Lien (2001) note, the 
rationales for related and for unrelated diversification differ fundamentally, with 
the former delivering advantages either through substitutability or complementar-
ities between resources, and the latter delivering advantages through the greater 
relative efficiency of  internal versus external capital markets and other finance- 
related advantages (e.g. risk-spreading) (e.g., Mueller, 1969; Trautwein, 1990).
Finance scholars have argued that due to inefficient internal capital markets, firms 
may diversify at the cost of  performance and firm value (Lamont, 2002; Shin and Stulz, 
1998). Following Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal article, many authors have also 
pointed to the managerial agency costs associated with diversification (e.g., Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Stulz, 1990). The performance 
effects of  diversification can be attributed to the way in which diversified firms allocate 
resources, often biased towards good opportunities in case of  related diversifiers, and to-
wards poor opportunities in more highly diversified firms (Rajan et al., 2000). As a result, 
stock markets tend to put a diversification discount on conglomerate stocks (Ammann 
et al., 2012; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Denis et al., 2002; 
Hoechle et al., 2012; Lang and Stulz, 2010; Servaes, 1996).
However, a number of  studies in the finance literature have cast doubt on whether the 
relationship between diversification and value is inherently negative (Klein, 2001). Several 
authors (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Chevalier, 2004; Graham et al., 2002; Villalonga, 
2001) have suggested that the diversification discount observed in the capital market 
results from selection effects, because discounted firms self-select into pursuing diver-
sification strategies. Using different methodologies, some studies even report a small 
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diversification premium (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Hund et al., 2012; Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga, 2010). More recently, Volkov and Smith (2015) and Rudolph and Schwetzler 
(2014) have found that the relative value of  diversified firms increases during recession-
ary periods, because their capacity to use internal capital markets provides them with 
advantages over more focused firms (see also Gopalan and Xie, 2011; Matvos and Seru, 
2012). This research thus suggests that the effects of  diversification may vary over time, 
due to economic conditions and other environmental factors.
In sum, two main insights emerge from our review of  the strategy and the finance lit-
eratures on the diversification–firm performance relationship. First, the traditional view 
has been that the effect of  diversification on firm performance is inverted U-shaped, 
such that low levels and related types of  diversification have positive firm performance 
consequences, whereas high levels and less related types of  diversification strategies have 
negative performance effects. Extant meta-analyses in this area have attested to this view 
(Bausch and Pils, 2009; Palich et al., 2000). However, there is considerable variation 
in the performance effects of  both related and unrelated diversification across firms 
(Rumelt, 1974). Furthermore, more recently authors have challenged the established 
view; specifically, they have cast doubt on whether higher levels and unrelated types of 
diversification are necessarily detrimental to performance. Second, there is no complete 
agreement with respect to whether the strength of  any effects of  (related or unrelated) 
diversification on performance have changed over time. The answer to this question 
appears to be subject to methodological choices and the type of  performance measure 
used. Furthermore, both temporal factors and the institutional environment in which 
the diversification–performance relationship is studied appear to play a role (Lee et al., 
2008; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Against this background, we now discuss the effects 
that environmental pressures have had on levels of  diversification, and on its relationship 
with performance.
Changes in Diversification Levels Over Time
Empirical research suggests that diversification among large US firms has decreased 
since the late 1970s or early 1980s (Chandler, 1990; Johnson et al., 2008). According to 
Basu (2010), this development slowed down during the 1990s and the early years of the 
new century. In the UK, the trend towards de-diversification is reported to have taken 
place in the late 1980s and the 1990s (Davies and Petts, 1997), in particular during 
the 1991/92 recession (Geroski and Gregg, 1997). With respect to other countries, the 
evidence is more mixed. Some authors report a reduction in diversification among com-
panies in several European countries (Whittington and Mayer, 2000). In Germany, 
however, changes in corporate diversification appear to have been small (Richter and 
Owen, 1997). For the 1987–1993 period, Davies and Petts (1997) even report an increase 
in diversification among German companies. In many emerging economies, average 
levels of diversification remain high due to the presence of integrated business groups 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2003; Khanna and Rivkin, 1997; Ramachandran et al., 2013), al-
though some studies suggest a gradual trend towards de-diversification in some of these 
countries (Hoskisson et al., 2005).
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The ‘refocusing’ literature suggests that changes in diversification in the US and the 
UK are the result of  both firm-specific and environmental factors (Johnson et al., 2008). 
In terms of  the latter category, three inter-related sets of  forces help to explain the de-
cline in levels of  diversification between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s. First, changes 
in factor markets, specifically a general shift in the balance of  power from managers to-
wards shareholders (Kochan and Useem, 2010; Useem, 1993), and other capital market 
pressures, have curbed the ability of  managers to engage in managerial empire build-
ing (Hope and Thomas, 2008). Diversification strategies may help managers to maxi-
mize their own utility at the expense of  shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). More 
well-developed and efficient external capital markets are more likely to penalize firms 
through share price discounts that, in turn, raise the likelihood of  takeover (Hoskisson 
and Turk, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991). External governance mechanisms have com-
plemented internal ones in forcing managers to pursue value maximization strategies 
(Aguilera et al., 2015).
Second, greater competition in product markets has forced firms to focus on those 
lines of  business where they have the clearest advantage over competitors (Peteraf, 1993; 
Teece, 1980), rather than to compete on scale by acquiring firms in other lines of  busi-
ness. According to Hoskisson and Hitt (1994), over-diversification was one of  the con-
tributing factors to the decline in competitiveness in the US in the 1970s. As global 
competition from countries such as Japan and Germany increased, US companies were 
forced to ‘downscope’ their businesses, in order to regain competitiveness.
Third, changes in the institutional environment – i.e., greater deregulation, privat-
ization and capital market liberalization – favoured reduced diversification (Lee et al., 
2008). For example, deregulation in the US (e.g., in communications, energy, and trans-
portation) and a more lenient interpretation of  restrictions on acquisitions in the same 
line of  business (e.g., Sherman Act of  1890 and Clayton Act of  1914) encouraged firms 
to invest in existing lines of  business rather than diversify (Harford, 1999; Opler et al., 
1999). In emerging economies, the gradual development of  the institutional environ-
ment has also begun to close ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) that diver-
sified corporate structures can fill. In their study of  diversification in six Asian countries, 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) found that diversification improved performance only in the 
least developed economies, but became detrimental to performance with increasing insti-
tutional development. Similarly, Guillen (2000) argued that the value of  the capabilities 
involved in managing diversified business groups, such as the capability to repeatedly 
enter new industries, is contingent on inefficiencies in the external environment in which 
these firms operate. Overall, the value of  internalizing transactions in diversified com-
panies, relative to the reliance on market transactions, may have decreased over time 
(Bhagat et al., 1990).
To summarize, beginning in the US, from the 1970s onwards a number of  changes 
have taken place in the institutional and economic environment in which firms oper-
ate, which have affected the relative advantages and disadvantages of  corporate di-
versification strategies. The environmental pressure towards greater de-diversification 
should have affected in particular those firms with higher levels of  diversification (i.e., 
unrelated diversifiers) to start with, than firms with low levels and more related forms of 
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diversification. As a result, overall levels of  diversification should have declined over time. 
In sum, we argue:
Hypothesis 1: Overall levels of diversification have decreased over time.
Changes in the Diversification–Performance Relationship Over Time
We propose that environmental pressures have led firms to select more value-creating 
diversification strategies and avoid value-destroying ones, thus leading to an improve-
ment in the aggregate relationship between diversification and firm performance. Our 
argument is based on the central conviction underlying strategic management theory 
that firms differ from one another in terms of their resources and capabilities (Barney 
and Arikan, 2001; Hansen et al., 2004). According to this view, the capacity to manage 
diversification is heterogeneously distributed across firms (Mackey et al., 2017). Some 
firms will be more successful than others in managing a particular degree of diversi-
fication, given their underlying resource endowments (Barney, 1991; Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt, 1991), capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Teece, 2007), or as a result of 
other firm characteristics (Rumelt, 1991).
Empirical research is consistent with the notion that firms differ considerably in terms 
of  their ability to manage diversification (Amit and Livnat, 1988; Klein and Lien, 2001). 
Some highly diversified firms outperform their focused yet otherwise similar competitors 
(Campa and Kedia, 2002; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). Scholars have identified 
a range of  factors that affect a firm’s optimal degree of  diversification, including own-
ership (George and Kabir, 2012) and organizational structure (Klein and Saidenberg, 
2009).
The choice of  the optimal diversification strategy will thus be endogenously deter-
mined (He, 2009). Firms will select the level and type of  diversification that best matches 
their capabilities, resources, and other firm-specific factors, and thus produces better 
performance outcomes relative to alternative diversification strategies (see Gomes and 
Livdan, 2004, and Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002 for similar arguments). However, the 
effectiveness of  this mechanism is contingent on the strength of  the selection environ-
ments in which firms operate (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983). Weak selection environ-
ments allow firms to “overdiversify” (Markides, 1992) – i.e., to pursue diversification 
strategies that are inconsistent with profit maximization. In contrast, increasing capital 
market pressures (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990) and greater product market competition 
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994) will force firms to choose a level and a type of  diversification 
that is associated with optimal performance. For example, Santalo and Becerra (2008) 
showed that with increasing competition among specialized firms in an industry, diver-
sified firms lost their prior performance advantage. Therefore, with increasing competi-
tion, firms will adapt their diversification strategies to performance-optimal levels.
We thus argue that the environmental pressures discussed above have affected not only 
overall levels of  diversification, but also the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance, as a result of  both negative and positive selection processes. Comparing 
firms with a given level of  diversification but heterogeneous resource and capability 
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endowments (Barney, 1991; Teece, 2007), the pressure to reduce their degree of  diversi-
fication should have been strongest for those firms that were least capable of  managing 
their diversification in a value-enhancing manner. Given an active market for corporate 
control (Hitt et al., 1996), firms with particularly value-destructive diversification strate-
gies will have been forced to de-diversify (e.g., through spin-offs or sell-offs; see Bergh et 
al., 2008); otherwise, they may have left the population of  firms through takeover and 
subsequent break-up, or through decline and exit (Daley et al., 1997). In contrast, firms 
with greater capacities to manage diversification successfully, and thus with better perfor-
mance, should have had greater likelihood of  survival (Pennings et al., 1994). Increasing 
environmental pressures thus imply that the incidence of  firms with diversification above 
their performance-optimal levels will have declined.
Therefore, assuming that empirical samples adequately represent the structure of 
the economy (or a particular subset thereof, such as the group of  the largest firms in a 
country), the average strength of  the association between performance and diversifica-
tion should have increased over time, because fewer firms were able to diversify above 
their performance-optimal level. Over time, samples of  diversified firms in a given econ-
omy should thus contain a larger proportion of  firms with positive performance conse-
quences. As a result, the aggregate (mean) performance effect of  diversification will have 
improved. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between diversification and firm performance has be-
come more positive over time.
Moreover, we argue that stronger selection environments will discriminate more 
clearly between firms with higher levels (i.e., unrelated forms) of  diversification, than 
between firms with lower levels and more related types of  diversification. The pursuit of 
unrelated diversification strategies is easily observable to external parties. If  firms with 
unrelated diversification strategies are perceived as underperforming, they often come 
under pressure to reduce their diversification through divestment or demerger (Hamilton 
and Chow, 1993; Haynes et al., 2000), or otherwise become subject to takeover (Berger 
and Ofek, 1996). As a result, the performance consequences of  unrelated diversification 
among the fewer remaining firms pursuing this strategy will have become better be-
cause firms with greater capacities to manage unrelated diversification should have faced 
less pressure to de-diversify (Mackey et al., 2017). Changes in the external environment 
reduce the relative advantage of  using internal capital markets. Therefore, only those 
unrelated diversifiers that rely on more firm-specific, inimitable sources of  diversifica-
tion advantages (e.g., superior managerial competencies, business models with a strong 
dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986)) will have remained in the game. In contrast, 
changes in the external environment are less likely to affect resource complementarities 
– which are prevalent among related lines of  business – because they are internal to 
the firm (Ennen and Richter, 2010). Therefore, the average strength of  the relationship 
between related diversification and performance will be less affected by environmental 
forces. We thus propose that:
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Hypothesis 3: The relationship between unrelated diversification and firm per-
formance has improved more over time than the relationship between related 
diversification and firm performance.
DATA AND METHODS
We used two sets of meta-analytic regression analyses (MARA; Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001) in order to examine the development of diversification levels over time and test 
our hypotheses regarding the inf luence of time on the diversification–performance rela-
tionship. Research questions investigating the development of a phenomenon over time 
are ideal for meta-analysis, because this method exploits variations across the settings of 
different primary studies (Aguinis et al., 2011; Geyskens et al., 2009).
Data
We followed a comprehensive three-step process to establish our database of pri-
mary studies. First, we used the primary studies from existing meta-analyses and 
literature reviews (Bausch and Pils, 2009; Benito-Osorio et al., 2012; Carney 
et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2008; Palich et al., 2000; Pils, 2009; Schüle, 1992). Second, we 
searched the ESBCO abstracts of articles published in the 50 leading business, finance, 
economics and management journals by SSCI impact factor for the terms ‘perform*’, 
‘value’ or ‘discount’ in combination with the terms ‘diversif*’ or ‘conglomerat*’. In step 
three, we applied the same search algorithm to the OATD database of dissertations. We 
also collected several additional studies that were cited in the literature review sections 
of the primary studies from steps one to three. This approach resulted in 1199 studies. 
We then screened these studies as to whether they reported at least one useable correla-
tion-based or partial correlation-based effect size (or the necessary data to compute it) 
between firm performance and diversification, and dropped those studies that did not. 
Our final sample consisted of 267 studies comprising 387 effect sizes. Our sample is sub-
stantially larger than any of the previous samples in the meta-analyses by Schüle (1992) 
(44 studies), Palich et al. (2000) (55 studies) and Bausch and Pils (2009) (104 studies). Out 
of the 267 studies, more than half have not been included in any of the previous me-
ta-analyses. Our sample comprises studies published between 1962 and 2016, and data 
collected between 1950 and 2011 (Appendix 1).
Measures
Dependent variables. In our test of Hypothesis 1, the dependent variable was the level of di-
versification, measured either as the arithmetic mean of the Herfindahl index, or as the 
Entropy index (related or unrelated components, or their sum). The Herfindahl index 
is defined as 
∑n
i=1 pipi where pi is the share of a company’s revenue in product i with 
respect to its overall revenue ( Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). The Herfindahl index takes 
a value of 0 for a perfectly diversified firm and a value of 1 for a firm with only one prod-
uct. The Entropy index is defined as 
∑n
i=1 piln
1
pi
 , where pi is the share of a company’s 
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revenue in business line i with respect to its overall revenue, and ln
(
1∕pi
)
 is the loga-
rithmic weight for each business line i ( Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). The Entropy index 
takes a value of 0 for a firm with only one business line, and has no upper limit. We did 
not combine these two measures of diversification because they use different scales (and 
in this analysis, we were interested in the absolute value of these measures rather than 
their correlations with performance).
In our second set of  analyses used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we ran meta-analytic 
regression analysis using effect sizes of  the relationship between (related, unrelated, and 
overall) diversification and (various measures of) performance as dependent variables. 
Effect sizes were calculated on the basis of  either product-moment correlations or partial 
correlations (Becker and Wu, 2007). We obtained correlations between diversification 
and performance from correlation tables reported in primary studies. In many cases 
where product-moment correlations were not reported, we were able to transform other 
reported data such as means and standard deviations, t-values, F-values, and p-values, 
into product-moment correlations, using the methods provided by Lipsey and Wilson 
(2001).
The diversification measure underlying the product-moment correlations had to relate 
to the level of  product (or service) diversification (as opposed to, for example, inter-
national diversification). Measurement of  diversification included Rumelt’s categories, 
his specialization and related ratios (Rumelt, 1982), Herfindahl (Hirschman, 1964) and 
Entropy (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) indices and industry count measures (Montgomery, 
1982). We coded the correlations for related, unrelated, and total diversification sepa-
rately (e.g., Jacquemin and Berry, 1979).
We included correlations when they were based on one of  the performance constructs 
followed by Palich et al. (2000): growth (sales growth, earnings growth), profitability (re-
turn on assets, return on equity, return on sales, return on investment), risk-adjusted 
market returns (Jensen, Treynor, and Sharpe ratios) or unadjusted market value (market-
to-book value, Tobin’s q). We also included excess value in the unadjusted market value 
category, in line with studies in the finance literature that often use this performance 
measure.
In those cases where a primary study did not provide product-moment correlations, 
we used partial correlations as our effect size measure (for this approach, see van Essen et 
al., 2013). Partial correlations were computed as rp =
t√
t2+df
, where t is the t-statistic and 
df relates to degrees of  freedom (Greene, 2008). The use of  t-statistics for aggregating 
partial correlations is a relatively simple approach, yet it makes more realistic demands 
on data availability than alternative methods, which often require raw data, covariance 
matrices, or other information not available in the context of  our investigation (Becker 
and Wu, 2007).
When multiple measurements of  the diversification–performance relationship were 
reported, we included all relationships in our analysis. Monte Carlo simulations have 
shown that procedures using the complete set of  measurements outperform alternative 
procedures (Bijmolt and Pieters, 2001).
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We applied appropriate corrections for statistical artifacts to each correlation (Hedges 
and Olkin, 1985; Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). First, we corrected for artificial dichotomi-
zation in the variables underlying the diversification–performance correlations (Hunter 
and Schmidt, 1990). For example, this was the case if  a study reported point-biserial 
correlations between two Rumelt (1982) categories (single-business firms vs. related-di-
versified firms) as dichotomized diversification variable, and a continuous performance 
variable. The dichotomization of  diversification is artificial because the underlying 
construct of  diversification is of  a continuous nature. These correlations suffer from 
downward distortion of  at least 20 per cent (in the case of  a 50-50 split between the ob-
servations of  the two diversification groups, see Hunter and Schmidt, 1990; Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001). In order to correct for this bias, we multiplied the original correlations by 
a factor of  
√
PQ
Φ(c)
, where P and Q are the split proportions of  the observations in the two 
groups (Q =1−P ), c is the cutoff  score which splits the standardized normal distribution 
into proportions P and Q, and Φ(c) is the normal curve ordinate for the cutoff  score c 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 1990).
Second, in order to make the diversification values comparable to one another, we 
reversed the product-moment correlations in which the underlying diversification or 
performance variable used reverse-scaled values. This was often the case when diversi-
fication was measured by the Herfindahl index (Hirschman, 1964) or Rumelt’s special-
ization ratio (Rumelt, 1982), such that low values represented high diversification and 
high values represented low diversification (e.g., Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). After the 
recalculation, a high value denoted a high diversification level. Reverse scaling was not 
an issue for studies using the Entropy index.
Third, we transformed the correlations using Fisher’s z-coefficients (Hedges and Olkin, 
1985). The z-transformed effect size is defined as ESzr = .5ln
(
1+r
1−r
)
, where r is the un-
standardized correlation coefficient (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). The z-transformation is 
a standard procedure in meta-analyses to account for undesirable statistical properties3 
of  correlations (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001) and to normalize the distribution of  the effect 
sizes (Rosenthal, 1991).
Independent variables. Our main independent variable of  interest was the time at which 
a primary study on diversification (and its performance effects) was carried out. For each 
study, we defined the variable median year of  data collection as the median year between 
the first and the last year of  observations used in that study (Carney et al., 2011). If  the 
count of  years was an even number, we used the mean of  the two middle years. For 
five studies which did not report the time period of  their observations (Hoskisson et al., 
2004; Mackey and Barney, 2013; Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Oyewobi et al., 2013; 
Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005), we used the year three years prior to the publication 
date. In order to study the development of  the effect size over time, we created separate 
samples if  the time span of  observations covered more than one decade. Five studies in 
our sample reported such observations (Grant and Jammine, 1988; Kaul, 2003; Lubatkin 
and Rogers, 1989; Mayer and Whittington, 2003; Servaes, 1996).
Furthermore, in order to test Hypothesis 3, we used dummy variables to distinguish be-
tween related, unrelated, and overall diversification, where overall diversification includes 
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both related and unrelated components. We coded these three dummy variables (related, 
unrelated and overall diversification) for each sample based on the diversification mea-
sure underlying the diversification–performance correlation. We followed the authors’ 
definition of  related and unrelated diversification unless it deviated from the convention 
that unrelated diversification is measured across 2-digit SIC industry groups and related 
diversification is measured across 4-digit SIC industry groups within a 2-digit SIC indus-
try group (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979), or their equivalents in non-US countries.
Control variables. We took into account a range of  substantive and methodological con-
trols. First, the diversification–performance relationship could be affected by a country’s 
environment beyond its financial, legal and labor market institutions. To account for 
country-level differences, we controlled for country size, measured in terms of  its total 
population. Furthermore, we used GDP per capita (expressed in constant 2005 US dol-
lars) to control for a country’s level of  economic development. These macroeconomic 
indicators are frequently used in cross-country studies and together also measure market 
size (Chakrabarti, 2001; Christmann et al., 1999; Fauver et al., 2003; Papageorgiadis et 
al., 2013; Qian et al., 2010, 2013). We also controlled for the level of  physical infrastructure 
by counting the number of  fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people. Carney et al. 
(2011) used a similar measure to account for potential voids in physical infrastructure. All 
three measures are taken from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 
2015). For each study in our sample, we used the value of  the respective control variable 
for the same year as the median year of  data collection of  the study.
Furthermore, we included country group dummies to account for unobserved institu-
tional and socio-economic differences between countries. We defined three dummies 
for country groups, which relate to the country underlying the firm-level sample of  each 
primary study or sample. The reference category is comprised of  Anglo-American coun-
tries (USA, UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Country group 1 takes a value of  1 
for European countries and Japan, and 0 otherwise. Country group 2 takes a value of  1 for 
all other countries (primarily developing countries), and 0 otherwise.
Second, we used a range of  methodological controls. To account for differences in 
journal quality, we controlled for journal impact factor, defined as the SSCI (Social Sciences 
Citation Index) average impact factor score for the years 2012 to 2014. We assigned a 
value of  0 to unpublished work and publications not covered by the SSCI index. Next, 
we controlled for the samples that used Fortune 500 firms by including a dummy vari-
able. Furthermore, a dummy variable longitudinal design indicated whether the primary 
study used a longitudinal (1) or a cross-sectional (0) design. We also controlled for stud-
ies from where we obtained partial instead of  full correlation coefficients by adding a 
dummy variable partial correlation that took the value of  1 when partial coefficients were 
used. We controlled for studies that used an SIC-based diversification measure, by add-
ing a dummy variable. Next, we treated the accounting performance constructs (growth 
and profitability) and the capital market performance constructs (risk-adjusted market 
returns and unadjusted market value) as separate samples in order to control for inher-
ent differences in measures of  performance, following Palich et al. (2000). We therefore 
defined a dummy variable for the capital market performance measure that took the value of  1 
for capital market performance and 0 for accounting performance. Finally, we controlled 
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for lack of  independence in effect sizes by including a dummy that took the value of  1 for those 
effect sizes that were not independent, i.e. those that came from samples that reported 
multiple effect sizes. These or similar control variables are commonly used in meta-ana-
lytical research (Carney et al., 2011; Heugens et al., 2009; Karna et al., 2016).
Analytical Approach
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we regressed the arithmetic mean of the diversification 
level on time (median year of data collection) as a predictor variable (see Lipsey and Wilson, 
2001, pp. 40–1). We ran different models for the Herfindahl index of total diversifica-
tion, the Entropy index of total diversification and the related and unrelated compo-
nents of the Entropy index, respectively.4 To calculate the optimal weight for each study, 
we obtained the standard deviation of the mean diversification level from the primary 
studies’ summary statistics (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).
For testing Hypotheses 2 and 3, we regressed the sample effect size (i.e., correlations 
between diversification and performance) on a battery of  sample and country charac-
teristics as independent variables. We repeated this analysis using the mean performance 
effects of  related, unrelated and overall diversification as dependent variables. In the re-
gressions, we accounted for differences in precision due to the number of  observations in 
each of  our samples by weighting the effect sizes by the inverse variance of  the effect size 
using formula provided by (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). Samples 
with more observations thus carry greater weight than samples with fewer observations. 
Because we are interested primarily in between-study variance, while controlling for the 
fact that multiple effects from the same study are not independent of  one another, we 
chose the random-effects over the fixed-effects model (Geyskens et al., 2009; Lipsey and 
Wilson, 2001).
In order to provide further evidence on how the mean performance effects of  diver-
sification changed across time periods, we also used Hedges–Olkin-type meta-analysis 
(HOMA) to calculate mean effect sizes (Geyskens et al., 2009; Hedges and Olkin, 1985; 
Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). We employed Stata macros including those by Wilson (1998) 
to carry out our MARA and HOMA analyses.
RESULTS
We used MARA in order to analyse changes in diversification levels over time, where 
the level of diversification serves as a dependent variable and time (median year of data collec-
tion) as an independent variable. Table 1 presents the results for different indices of di-
versification. Total diversification is measured with both the Herfindahl (Model 1) and 
the Entropy (Model 2) indices. Additionally, related (Model 3) and unrelated (Model 4) 
diversification are measured with the Entropy index. We chose these indicators over 
alternative diversification measures, such as count-of-industries, because a greater num-
ber of studies reported them. In order to ascertain the shape of the relationship between 
time and diversification, we compared outputs from linear, quadratic and cubic model 
specifications, reporting in Table 1 those models that displayed optimal fit. We ran all 
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of these models also with control variables, namely journal quality (SSCI index) and GDP 
per capita (as a measure of country development). The results did not differ materially 
from those reported below, hence for reasons of parsimony we chose not to include them 
in Table 1.
All models except for the one represented in Model 2 explain a sizeable amount of  the 
variation in diversification levels, with R2-values between 0.11 and 0.22, and F-values 
significant at p < 0.05. Regardless of  measurement, the coefficient on the median year of 
data collection variable carried a negative sign in all models. The decline is significant at p 
< 0.01 for samples that measure diversification with the Herfindahl index of  total diver-
sification (Model 1).
When the Entropy index of  total diversification was used, the coefficient on the me-
dian year of  data collection variable was negative, but did not reach statistical signifi-
cance (Model 2). In order to explore this result further, we disaggregated the analysis by 
distinguishing between related and unrelated diversification. For related diversification 
(Model 3), we find evidence of  a U-shaped development of  related diversification over 
time (p < 0.01 for both the linear and the quadratic regression coefficients). According 
to the model, levels of  related diversification declined in the late 1970s and the 1980s to 
reach their minimum in 1995, in order to rise again thereafter.
Levels of  unrelated diversification, in contrast, appear to have declined over time in a 
linear fashion, and this decline was statistically significant, albeit only weakly so (p < 0.1) 
(Model 4). These diverging developments thus explain why the decline in overall levels 
of  diversification as measured by the Entropy index (Model 2) was not statistically signif-
icant: Whereas levels of  unrelated diversification appear to have declined continuously, 
levels of  related diversification appear to have declined until around 1995 before increas-
ing again, thus leading to no significant change in overall diversification when measured 
by the Entropy index.5
In sum, the results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1 according to which lev-
els of  diversification have decreased over time. Considering the significant decline in 
diversification when measured by the Herfindahl index (Model 1), and the conflicting 
developments with respect to diversification when measured by the Entropy indices of 
related and unrelated diversification (Models 3 and 4), the decline in overall diversifi-
cation appears to have come primarily from the reduction in unrelated diversification, 
whereas firms appear to have seen an increase in related diversification, following an 
initial decrease.
We then conducted MARA in order assess the effect of  time on the strength of  the 
relationship between related, unrelated and overall diversification and firm performance 
(Table 2). All three regression models include two sets of  controls, and were highly signifi-
cant (p < 0.01). First, we included a battery of  methodological controls, as detailed above. 
Few of  these were statistically significant. The journal impact factor variable proved to be 
statistically significant in Models 2 and 3, however, with an inconsistent result: Whereas 
in Model 2, which focuses on the performance effects of  related diversification, journal im-
pact factor had a positive and significant effect, in Model 3, which uses the performance ef-
fects of  unrelated diversification as dependent variable, journal impact factor had a negative 
and significant effect. The performance effects reported in studies using capital market 
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Table II. Results of meta-analytic regression analysis (MARA)
Dependent variable: Diversification-performance correlations
Models 1 2 3
Variables Overall, related and unrelated div. Related diversification Unrelated diversification
Constant 0.013 (0.054) 0.299** (0.091) −0.313** (0.103)
Methodological controls
Journal impact factora −0.043 (0.389) −1.610* (0.729) 1.551* (0.768)
Fortune 500 sample −0.031 (0.021) −0.044 (0.030) −0.057 (0.040)
Longitudinal design 0.002 (0.018) −0.001 (0.030) −0.028 (0.034)
Partial correlationb 0.049* (0.019) 0.027 (0.032) 0.002 (0.038)
SIC-based diversification measure −0.004 (0.017) 0.050† (0.029) −0.032 (0.036)
Capital market performance measurec −0.029† (0.015) −0.037 (0.023) −0.055† (0.034)
Lack of independence in effect sizesd 0.008 (0.016) −0.004 (0.050) 0.065† (0.038)
Country-level controls
Country sizee −0.085* (0.036) −0.223* (0.090) −0.100 (0.081)
GDP per capitae −0.001 (0.003) −0.008 (0.005) −0.010† (0.005)
Physical infrastructure −0.001 (0.001) −0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Country group 1f −0.027 (0.027) 0.028 (0.118) 0.041 (0.053)
Country group 2g −0.077 (0.052) −0.209† (0.126) −0.298** (0.108)
Shape of the relationship
Related diversificationh 0.060** (0.020)
Unrelated diversificationh −0.050** (0.018)
Time effect
Median year of data collectioni 0.021 (0.015) 0.033 (0.038) 0.112** (0.038)
R2 0.11 0.30 0.32
K 314 68 79
QModel 48.20 (0.000) 27.55 (0.01) 36.02 (0.00)
QResidual 401.32 (0.00) 65.12 (0.14) 75.65 (0.17)
K = number of effect sizes; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test statistic (with its probability in parentheses below)
aDef lated by a factor of 100
bDummy variable (1 = sample with partial correlation, 0 = product-moment correlation)
cDummy variable (1 = capital market performance as performance measure, 0 = accounting-based performance)
dDummy variable (1 = sample with multiple effect sizes, 0 = sample with one effect size
eDef lated by a factor of 1000
fDummy variable for Europe and Japan; default category: Anglo-American countries (USA, UK, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand)
gDummy variable for all other countries; default category: Anglo-American countries (USA, UK, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand)
hDummy variable; default category: overall diversification
iDef lated by a factor of 10.
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10.
Standard errors of regression coefficients in parentheses.
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based measures of  performance were lower than when accounting-based performance 
measures were used in two of  the three regression analyses (Models 1 and 2).
Second, we included controls relating to the country in which the primary studies 
were carried out. We find some evidence that in large countries, the performance effects 
of  diversification were lower than in smaller countries (β = −0.087; p < 0.05 in Model 
1; β = −0.223; p < 0.05 in Model 2). Furthermore, the level of  economic development 
appears to be associated with lower effects of  (unrelated) diversification on performance, 
as indicated by the negative coefficients of  the GDP per capita variable and the country group 
2 dummy (country group 2 includes primarily developing countries) in Model 3 however, 
these effects were weak (p < 0.1).
Model 1, which includes the full set of  observations, focuses on the overall perfor-
mance effects of  all types of  diversification. In order to ascertain the impact of  differ-
ent types of  diversification on the diversification–performance relationship, it includes 
dummy variables for related and unrelated diversification. The coefficient on related 
diversification is positive and significant (β = 0.060; p < 0.01), and the coefficient on 
unrelated diversification is negative and significant (β = −0.050; p < 0.01). These results 
are consistent with the findings by Palich et al. (2000), who interpreted them as evidence 
of  an inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm performance. The 
temporal effect (median year of  data collection) is positive but not statistically significant 
(β = 0.021; p = 0.167). Therefore, Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the relationship 
between diversification and firm performance has become more positive over time, is not 
supported.
Models 2 and 3 respectively report the performance effects of  related and unrelated 
diversification. Both Models have considerably higher explanatory power (R2 = 0.30 
and 0.32 for Models 2 and 3 respectively) than Model 1 (R2 = 0.11). In Model 2, which 
focuses on related diversification, the time effect is again positive but not statistically sig-
nificant, in line with the results of  the HOMA (see below). Therefore, the performance 
effects of  related diversification appear not to have changed significantly over time. In 
contrast, the time effect in Model 3, which studies the performance effects of  unrelated 
diversification, is highly significant and carries the expected positive sign (β = 0.112; p 
< 0.01). We followed Jarrell and Stanley (2004) in implementing a Chow test in order to 
compare Models 2 and 3, which confirmed that the coefficients are statistically different 
from each other (F14,121 = 7.040, p < 0.01).
In sum, the results show that although the effects of  unrelated diversification on per-
formance are negative overall, they have improved significantly with the passage of  time. 
Given that the aggregate performance effects of  related diversification have remained 
relatively stable, this development thus means that the difference between the perfor-
mance effects of  related and unrelated diversification have declined in magnitude over 
time. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 3, which predicted that the relation-
ship between unrelated diversification and firm performance has improved more over 
time than the relationship between related diversification and firm performance.
In order to provide further illustrative evidence on the temporal development of  the 
performance effects of  diversification, we also ran a set of  HOMA analyses (Table 3). 
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With respect to all models, Cochran’s Q-values reject the assumption of  homogeneity. 
The mean effect size for the diversification–firm performance relationship across all 
time periods is r̄ =−0.03, and it differs from zero at 99.9 per cent significance level. We 
then ran separate HOMAs for the observations by the decade in which the primary 
data were collected. During the 1970s, the mean performance effect of  diversification 
was r̄ =−0.08 (p < 0.05). In the decades thereafter, this value then declined to between 
r̄ =−0.04 and r̄ =−0.02, less than half  of  its earlier value. Since 2000, it appears to have 
edged up again to r̄ =−0.03.
The HOMA for the performance effects of  related diversification showed no signif-
icant mean effect sizes, except for the 1980s where the value is positive (r̄ =0.04) and 
weakly significant (p < 0.1). Overall, the effect of  related diversification on performance 
is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unrelated diversification had a clear, 
Table III. Development of the diversification-performance relationship over time (HOMA)
Hedges and Olkin meta-analysis (HOMA)
Median Year of Data 
Collection K r̄ SEr 95% CI Q pQ
Overall, related and 
unrelated diversification
All time periods 387 −0.03** 0.01 −0.03 −0.04 3044.40 0.00
Before 1970 20 0.01 0.05 −0.10 0.11 120.11 0.00
1970 – 1979 37 −0.08* 0.03 −0.15 −0.01 243.54 0.00
1980 – 1989 104 −0.04** 0.01 −0.07 −0.01 605.02 0.00
1990 – 1999 144 −0.02† 0.01 −0.04 0.00 1381.12 0.00
2000 or later 82 −0.03** 0.01 −0.05 −0.01 641.56 0.00
Related diversification
All time periods 82 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.04 319.20 0.00
Before 1970 4 0.09 0.10 −0.11 0.29 15.62 0.00
1970 – 1979 9 −0.02 0.05 −0.12 0.08 33.99 0.00
1980 – 1989 21 0.04† 0.02 −0.00 0.08 35.25 0.02
1990 – 1999 27 0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.05 71.08 0.00
2000 or later 21 −0.01 0.02 −0.06 0.04 94.07 0.00
Unrelated diversification
All time periods 97 −0.07** 0.01 −0.10 −0.05 532.05 0.00
Before 1970 10 −0.08 0.11 −0.29 0.13 92.01 0.00
1970 – 1979 10 −0.15** 0.05 −0.25 −0.05 36.95 0.00
1980 – 1989 26 −0.10** 0.03 −0.15 −0.05 85.16 0.00
1990 – 1999 38 −0.06** 0.02 −0.10 −0.03 185.02 0.00
2000 or later 13 −0.02 0.03 −0.07 0.03 79.60 0.00
K = number of effect sizes; r̄  = mean effect size; SEr = standard error of mean effect size; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity 
test; pQ  = probability of Q ; Results are inverse Fisher zr transformed (i.e., results are correlations).**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10
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negative performance effect (r̄ =−0.07; p < 0.01). This negative effect was greatest in the 
1970s (r̄ =−0.15; p < 0.01); thereafter, its magnitude declined continuously (r̄ =−0.10 
in the 1980s and r̄ =−0.06 in the 1990s) to become insignificantly different from zero 
in the years since 2000 (r̄ =−0.02; n.s.). The analysis thus supports the argument that 
the difference between the mean performance effects of  unrelated and those of  related 
diversification have decreased over time, as proposed in Hypothesis 3.
Robustness Tests
We ran several robustness checks to ensure that our findings hold in spite of some differ-
ences in the sample. First, we excluded outliers (samples with extreme effect size values) 
from our analyses, finding that our regression results did not change materially. Second, 
with respect to our regression on levels of diversification (Table 1), we used a dummy for 
emerging market country as a control variable in order to control that diversification 
decreased not only in developed, but also in emerging countries.6 Finally, we ran a ro-
bustness check by eliminating studies that did not report time. The results were similar 
to the main regression models, including the direction and significance levels of the time 
dummy.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Summary and Theoretical Implications
The objective of our paper was to analyse changes in both the level of diversification and 
its relationship with firm performance over time. In our study, we were able to build on 
the rich literature on diversification and its performance outcomes, including several 
meta-analyses (Bausch and Pils, 2009; Palich et al., 2000; Schüle, 1992). However, from 
our perspective, much of this literature has taken too broad a view of diversification. For 
example, extant research has chronicled the decline in overall levels of diversification, 
in particular in the 1980s and 1990s (Davis et al., 1994; Fligstein and Markowitz, 1993; 
Lichtenberg, 1992). At first sight, our meta-analysis, which includes primary studies 
from 60 years of research, confirms this result: Overall levels of diversification have 
declined, at least when diversification is measured by the Herfindahl index (Table 1, 
Model 1). When the Entropy index of diversification is used, this decline is visible, too, 
although the coefficient on the time variable is not statistically significant (Table 1, 
Model 2). However, when running the analysis separately for related diversification 
and for unrelated diversification, we find interesting differences in their development 
over time. Unrelated diversification seems to have declined in a linear fashion (Table 1, 
Model 4). In contrast, related diversification appears to have increased again since the 
mid-1990s, following an initial decrease in the late 1970s and during the 1980s (Table 1, 
Model 3).
Our analysis with respect to levels of  diversification thus suggests that the pressure to 
de-diversify over time has not been uniform across the samples of  firms analysed here. 
Furthermore, our study suggests that in the context of  the long-term decline in overall 
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levels of  diversification, the relationship between unrelated diversification and firm per-
formance has changed considerably. At first sight, the diversification–performance rela-
tionship appears familiar in that it is consistent with the findings produced in previous 
studies: Our MARA (Table 2, Model 1) confirms the results by Schüle (1992), Palich 
et al. (2000) and Bausch and Pils (2009), in that related diversification has a significant 
positive effect on performance, and unrelated diversification a negative and significant 
effect on performance. The overall (aggregate) effect size is −0.03 (p < 0.01; see Table 3). 
This finding holds true for both accounting-based performance and for capital market 
performance measures.
However, this result masks another finding that we believe is indicative of  a long-
term shift in the inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm per-
formance widely reported in the extant literature (Pierce and Aguinis, 2013; Rumelt, 
1974). Namely, we find that the relationship between unrelated diversification and firm 
performance has improved significantly over time (Table 2, Model 3). This change is 
significantly different from the development of  the relationship between related diversifi-
cation and performance, as the application of  the Chow test demonstrates. The HOMA 
further illustrates the steady improvement in the mean performance effect of  unrelated 
diversification (Table 3). In contrast, the mean performance effect of  related diversifica-
tion remained virtually unchanged.
In sum, our study challenges the conventional wisdom that the shape of  the diversi-
fication–performance relationship is inherently inverted U-shaped. We believe that this 
particular shape of  the relationship may have been historically true due a weak selec-
tion environment that allowed more firms to pursue unrelated diversification strategies 
with detrimental performance outcomes. With the strengthening of  the selection envi-
ronment over time, the number of  unrelated diversifiers has decreased. For the lower 
number of  firms pursuing unrelated diversification, the performance implications of  this 
strategy appear to be considerably better than was the case in earlier decades. Thus, the 
right-hand side of  the inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification and per-
formance appears to have become flatter over time.
Overall, the findings are consistent with our theoretical argument that suggests that if 
the relationship between diversification and firm performance varies across environmen-
tal conditions (Lee et al., 2008), it will also do so over time. Underlying this argument is 
the conviction that firms differ from one another in terms of  their resources, capabilities 
and other firm-specific factors (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Hoopes and Madsen, 2008). 
Likewise, the capacity to manage diversification is heterogeneously distributed across 
firms (Mackey et al., 2017). Extant research has already identified firm-specific factors 
such as organization structure (Klein and Saidenberg, 2009) and ownership structure 
(George and Kabir, 2012) as factors that materially affect the performance implications 
of  diversification. Furthermore, there is evidence that some firms are better than others 
at creating synergies from related diversification, or using internal capital markets in 
the pursuit of  unrelated diversification (Stein, 1997). Other firms may also have im-
proved their capacity to manage unrelated diversification, as a result of  organizational 
learning (Pennings et al., 1994). The performance-optimal level of  diversification thus 
differs across firms. Given that diversification in general (and unrelated diversification in 
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particular) may also serve purposes other than value maximization (e.g., Jensen, 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Stulz, 1990) it will then depend on 
the strength of  environmental factors whether firms are forced to make performance-op-
timal choices about their diversification strategies.
Managerial Implications
Given the heterogeneity in the performance effects of diversification discussed above, 
decision-makers should not rely on generic recipes to diversify or refocus. They should 
define their (diversification) strategies in light of their firm-specific resources and ca-
pabilities (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), and the external conditions in which their 
firms operate (Li and Greenwood, 2004). For example, our analysis – specifically the 
significant coefficient on country size in two of the three regressions reported in Table 2 
– provides some indications that diversification may provide market opportunities for 
firms that are constrained by small domestic markets.
It is important to point out that our findings are not a carte blanche for strategies of 
over-diversification. While the strength of  the negative effect of  unrelated diversification 
on performance has declined in magnitude, it has not turned positive either (see the lower 
panel of  Table 3); and the negative performance effect of  overall levels of  diversification 
has remained negative (see the top panel in Table 3). Managers should thus analyse a 
decision to enter a new line of  business carefully, and decide on the merits of  each case.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Our study is subject to both theoretical and methodological limitations that should be 
addressed in future research. First, at the heart of our analysis are changes in diver-
sification and in its performance effects over time, yet we do not study the drivers of 
these inter-temporal changes in a systematic fashion. Our analysis includes a range of 
country-level controls relating to the economic environment, specifically country size, 
GDP per capita, and physical infrastructure. In separate analyses, we included mea-
sures of capital market efficiency (World Bank, 2015), and instfitutional factors such as 
Spamann’s (2010) anti-director index and the rule of law indicator (Kaufmann et al., 
2003) without finding any significant effects. However, these measures are available 
only since about the 1990s, approximately a third of the 60-year time window analysed 
here. Furthermore, such measures tend to be too coarse to allow reliable comparisons of 
institutional conditions across multiple countries. We believe that an in-depth study of 
how institutional and other environmental conditions affect the diversification behavior 
of firms, and the performance implications of diversification, will require a longitudinal 
analysis within particular countries.
Second, we acknowledge that in our regression analysis, a lot of  residual variance re-
mains. The independent variables thus explain only a small proportion of  the variance 
in the dependent variables. Our understanding of  the drivers of  diversification, and 
in particular of  the diversification–performance relationship, thus remains underdevel-
oped. For example, as most studies use ‘mixed’ samples of  firms (e.g., in terms of  age, 
organization structures, etc.), potential firm-specific drivers of  diversification and of  the 
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strength of  the diversification-performance relationship remain largely hidden from our 
analysis. Likewise, apart from our coarse distinction between related and unrelated di-
versification, we cannot compare (samples of) firms that pursue particular diversification 
strategies (e.g., those that seek to build vertical relationships among their different busi-
nesses as compared to horizontal diversifiers (Ansoff, 1957); those that pursue diversifica-
tion through cooperative strategies as compared to those that do so on their own (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998)). Future research should seek to provide a more fully-fledged overview 
of  the drivers of  diversification and its performance consequences.
Third, our study follows common practice in that diversification is defined and mea-
sured at the firm level. Underlying this focus is the conventional image of  the publicly 
owned corporation. However, the decline in diversification that authors such as Michael 
C Jensen (1997) foresaw was part of  the overall demise (‘eclipse’) of  the public corpora-
tion. In this context, it may well be the case that the ‘locus’ of  diversification may have 
shifted to types of  ownership structures whose importance, relative to public ownership 
by widely dispersed shareholders, has arguably increased (e.g., private equity, new types 
of  family offices, etc.). Our analysis of  the decline in diversification at the corporate level 
may thus tell only half  of  the story. Future research should investigate changes in firm 
diversification and in the context of  changes in ownership structures.
Finally, we acknowledge that we have been liberal in discussing the performance ‘ef-
fects’ or ‘outcomes’ of  diversification, implying a causal relationship where there may 
only by a correlation. Many of  the empirical studies on the diversification–performance 
relationship employ instrumental variable designs and other approaches to ascertain the 
order of  causality. We included a dummy variable denoting the use of  partial correlation 
coefficients (i.e., regression coefficients, which should provide somewhat greater confi-
dence in the causal nature of  the relationship under investigation than correlation coeffi-
cients). This dummy variable proved significant in only one of  our three MARA models 
(Table 2, Model 1). However, attempts to determine the ‘right order of  causality’ are 
fairly futile in light of  the theoretical argument that firms’ diversification choices are en-
dogenously determined (He, 2009). In line with this argument, we believe that (expected) 
performance may “drive” diversification as much as diversification ‘drives’ performance, 
and that both of  them are driven by underlying resources and capabilities. The analysis 
of  effect sizes measured at the sample-level in meta-analytical research tends to cloud the 
endogenous nature of  the relationships investigated here. To overcome this limitation, 
the application of  Bayesian methods to firm-level data (Mackey et al., 2017) is proving 
particularly fruitful.
Given our finding that the performance effects of  related and unrelated diversification 
have become more similar over time, we believe that future research should also re-con-
ceptualize the very notion of  (un-)relatedness. In recent work, Nocker et al. (2016) ar-
gued that supply-side measures of  relatedness (based on product categories and industry 
classifications) should be complemented by demand-side ones (relatedness of  customer 
groups / market segments). In addition, we believe it would be worthwhile to consider 
relatedness in terms of  commonality between business models (Teece, 2010) across dif-
ferent lines business pursued by a firm. When analysed from alternative perspectives, 
diversification may have different (types of) outcomes. These alternative perspectives 
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would then also have practical implications for ‘parenting strategies’ (Roghé et al., 2013) 
employed by firms.
CONCLUSION
Despite the limitations of our analysis, we believe our study provides clear indications 
that both levels of diversification, and the nature of its relationships with firm perfor-
mance, have changed over time. As levels of diversification have declined, so has the 
effect of diversification, and of unrelated diversification in particular, on firm perfor-
mance. Our study calls for greater emphasis to be put on the temporal nature of the 
phenomena considered in strategic management research.
NOTES
 [1] We will discuss the relationship between related and unrelated types (or forms) of diversifica-
tion on the one hand, and levels of diversification on the other, below.
 [2] Palich, Cardinal and Miller (2000) interpreted the positive effect of related diversification on 
performance and the negative effect of unrelated diversification on performance as evidence 
of an inverted U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm performance, assum-
ing that unrelated diversification occurs at higher levels of diversification.
 [3] If the sampling distribution of the observed outcomes is approximately normal, Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation is an effective normalizing transformation with variance-stabilizing prop-
erties. When the sampling variances of the observed outcomes are (at least approximately) 
known, for the raw correlation coefficients, the sampling variance is approximately equal 
to Var[r] = (1−ρ2)2/(n−1). However, the value of ρ in this equation is unknown. Using the 
observed correlation (i.e., r) will provide an inaccurate estimate of the sampling variation, 
especially in smaller samples. In contrast, the sampling variance of an r-to-z transformed cor-
relation is approximately equal to Var[z]=1/(n − 3) – i.e., it does not depend on any unknown 
quantities.
 [4] The Herfindahl index was not split into its related and unrelated components as the sample 
size in each of the two subgroups would have been too small for a meaningful regression 
analysis.
 [4] The Herfindahl index was not split into its related and unrelated components as the sample 
size in each of the two subgroups would have been too small for a meaningful regression 
analysis
 [5]  The Herfindahl and Entropy indices differ in measurement insofar as the Herfindahl index 
has an upper limit of 1, whereas the Entropy index has no upper limit. Therefore, the Entropy 
index is better able to discriminate between moderate, high and very high levels of diversifi-
cation, and we deem it to be the more reliable measurement of unrelated diversification.
 [6]  We used the International Monetary Fund (2014) definition of emerging market and devel-
oping economies.
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